Computer networks are undergoing a phenomenal growth, driven by the rapidly increasing number of nodes constituting the networks. At the same time, the number of security threats on Internet and intranet networks is constantly growing, and the testing and experimentation of cyber defense solutions requires the availability of separate, test environments that best emulate the complexity of a real system. Such environments support the deployment and monitoring of complex mission-driven network scenarios, thus enabling the study of cyber defense strategies under real and controllable tra c and attack scenarios. In this paper, we propose a methodology that makes use of a combination of techniques of network and security assessment, and the use of cloud technologies to build an emulation environment with adjustable degree of a nity with respect to actual reference networks or planned systems. As a byproduct, starting from a speci c study case, we collected a dataset consisting of complete network traces comprising benign and malicious tra c, which is feature-rich and publicly available.
INTRODUCTION
Context and Motivation. Starting from the past decade, cyber attacks have become increasingly sophisticated, stealthy, targeted and multi-faceted, featuring zero-day exploits and highly creative interdisciplinary attack methods. Furthermore, it is most likely an upward trend, due to two main factors: (i) increasing complexity of ICT networks and (ii) increasing capabilities of cyber attackers. As a consequence, cyber security is becoming of primary importance for every organization, including small and medium enterprises Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ICDCN '19, January 4-7, 2019, Bangalore, India © 2019 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6094-4/19/01. . . $15.00 https://doi.org /10.1145/3288599.3288618 and large companies, as well as critical infrastructures on which our society is becoming increasingly dependent.
One of the countermeasures that can be taken to face attackers is to try to play the role of the attacker and stress the environment that is aimed to protect. However, in order to enable this possibility, a separate, dedicated emulation/simulation environment must be set in place. Such environment should be able to: (i) represents realistic cyber environments that t the testing objectives, (ii) o er tools for producing both benign and malicious system events and (iii) support the de nition and creation of new scenarios and cyber threats in a cost and time-e ective manner [3, 11] .
Combining network and security assessment techniques with the use of cloud technologies allows for the deployment of emulation environments. The objective of an emulation environment is enabling the deployment of fully virtualized instances of computer networks, with adjustable degree of a nity with respect to an actual reference networks or planned systems [12] , allowing for arbitrary speculative analyses, notably for what concerns cyber security. Related Work. To the best of our knowledge, currently, very few complete solutions exist to support the design, development and deployment of an emulation environment to support testing and training. In [3] the authors proposed a Virtual Infrastructure for Network Emulation (VINE), pointing out for a set of tools that helps the construction of virtual topologies allowing for di erent type of experiments for cyber security researchers. Furthermore, VINE supports tra c behavior generation using monitored agents or the traditional packet capture for a low-level analysis of the state of the hosts. Operators can exploit a web-based interface, to manually create, modify, and monitor experiment testbeds. The main drawback of this paper is that the platform is overviewed at a rather general viewpoint, without allowing for a deep comparison. In the speci c context of cybersecurity, in [11] , the Cyber Range Instantiation System (CyRIS) system is presented, as a solution, based on OpenStack, for reliably and repeatably deploying cyber ranges, i. e., , technology development environments for cybersecurity training courses. It supports basic automation for systems and network deployment, and a certain degree of automation for sophisticated security activities (such as modifying rewall rules or planting malware). Another, close-sourced example is [20] . While these works provide valid tools for deploying testbeds for cyber experimentation, none of them tackles the task of documenting a methodological framework for creating emulation environments (along with the multiple existing technical tradeo s). Our paper, instead, presents a complete end-to-end methodology to build a virtual environment and deploying a cyber security testbed, mapped from an existing network. Furthermore, our work directly shows the bene t of the approach by providing a realistic dataset which can bene t multiple sides of the cyber-security scienti c community.
Contributions. This paper provides three main contributions: (i) it proposes a methodology for designing and deploying a cloudbased emulation environment, (ii) it discusses the application of the proposed methodology to a case study and (iii) it shows the exibility and power of the proposed approach to build an environment that is able to generate a realistic dataset, comprising of benign and malicious tra c. Furthermore, the dataset has been processed to obtain feature-rich labeled attack ows, useful for cyber security analyses such as training IDS and IPS classi ers and other machine-learning tasks, as well as for deep packet inspection investigation and related activities. In particular, we exploit our practical study case to highlight, for each step of the methodology, how the relevant technologies and tools can be combined to achieve speci c design requirements in an e ective way.
METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present a methodology for the design and deployment of a cloud-based emulation environment to support cybersecurity testing, analysis and training activities.
The main goal of our methodology is to drive designers and system analysts in the creation of a virtualized environment that is able to reproduce a target networked physical environment, which will be used as a testbed. The virtual environment will be deployed in a private cloud (leveraging IaaS frameworks) built on dedicated hardware. Our approach is articulated in three main activities: (i) Virtual Environment Infrastructure setup (i. e., how to set up a private cloud based on the physical infrastructure), (ii) Virtual Network Design and (iii) Data Collection from a deployed testbed. We will use the term virtual and emulation environments interchangeably to refer to the enabling infrastructure and emulation/virtual testbed to mean the reproduced network within it. Virtual Environment Infrastructure Setup. This activity takes care of the design and deployment of the virtual environment on dedicated hardware. It is articulated along the following tasks: (a) select a cloud management platform to manage the storage and compute resources provided by the physical infrastructure, (b) de ne storage management policies for the virtual machines templates repository, in a way to foster data locality at instantiation time and fault tolerance and nally (c) design and deployment of the virtual communication infrastructure. Section 2.1 discusses this activity, suggesting technological options to support each task. Virtual Network Design This activity has the objective, starting from a reference network speci cation, to create a testbed con guration, i. e., all the metadata needed to deploy its virtual counterpart.
This can be done main in two ways: (i) by manually de ning the characteristics of the required network or (ii) by gathering information from an existing network in order to clone it or use it as starting point. In the following, we will consider the second and most challenging case. To this aim, we will discuss the following necessary tasks: (i) network topology identi cation,(ii) OS detection, and (iii) active service discovery in Section 2.2.
Data Collection This activity is responsible of ensuring proper handling of the experimental data (in the form of tra c captures) generated by the emulated testbed, and is reported in Section 2.3.
Virtual Environment Infrastructure
In the following, we provide an overview of the main steps required to build up an emulation environment stack that ts our purposes of network emulation and cyber security experimentation.
2.1.1 Private cloud Setup. Many IaaS platforms exist, and each one has its speci c characteristics, furthermore, some platforms are constantly developing. The two major open-source ones by market penetration are OpenStack and OpenNebula, currently widely used by many people around the world [17] . In order to set up our private cloud environment, we compared them taking into account the following features, namely Internal Organization, Software Deployment, Storage, Networking, Hypervisors and Governance. The full comparison can be found in [16] . After the analysis and experimentation with both, we found OpenNebula's solution both enterprise-ready and easy to use and deploy, thus being a good t for any organization. We chose OpenNebula as our IaaS for our case study (Section 3).
Storage and Distributed File
System. In a typical real environment, machines run various operating systems. On all cloud platforms, VM types have a corresponding notion of template 1 : a collection of data (i. e., a set of disk images) and metadata (i. e., no. of associated cores, RAM, network interfaces, booting order, context information, etc).
Thus, typically when setting up an emulated environment, a proper template repository must be maintained, i. e., a physical area where templates are stored, so that they can be easily browsed and recalled at VM instantiation time. However, VMs can be instantiated on all physical nodes in the cluster, so a centralized repository would result in heavy load on the cluster (especially as such templates can be large, typically in the order of 20-100 Gbytes). Therefore, a distribution or replication strategy could be implied.
GlusterFS, is a scalable, distributed le system that aggregates disk storage resources from a pool of trusted storage servers into a single global namespace. It is used in production at thousands of enterprises spanning media, healthcare, government, education, web 2.0, and nancial services [15] . A gluster volume is a logical collection of export directories (called bricks) located on the various servers of the pool. Various types of volumes are supported, and can be chosen depending on the distribution criteria that ts a speci c use-case. To exploit data-locality at VM instantiation time, a good choice is setting up a Replicated GlusterFS Volume Apart for the inherent data redundancy, this solution also o ers reliability as in case of a brick failure, the data can still be recovered from its replicas. Gluster supports LVM Volumes as mount points, so that multiple disks can be used for each server and regarded as a single volume.
Other options include Lustre and Ceph. OpenNebula storage is structured around the Datastore concept, i. e., any storage medium to store disk images. It makes use of a Datastore called Images, that points to the GlusterFS mount point, plus, other two (non replicated) datastores: System, containing the instantiated machines data and Files & Kernels to store plain text les such as scripts.
Communication layer.
In virtual environments, VMs are connected to virtual networks (VLANs) via virtual network interfaces.
IntraLAN communication refers to interactions among VMs in the same VLAN, while interLAN refers to cross VLAN communication. The VLAN deployment and communications are managed in rst instance by the IaaS platform. The Layer 3 communication between di erent VLANs is made possible by Virtual routers (VR), another type of VM that works just like a physical Layer 3 router, thus allowing for the de nition of speci c routing tables, gateways, etc.. A VR has one network interface in each VLAN that it manages. However VMs might be deployed on di erent physical servers, therefore VLANs can span di erent nodes, that are in turn connected via physical switches. Virtual switches are a key component in virtual environments, as they provide Hypervisors with connectivity between virtual interfaces of the VMs and the physical interfaces of the various nodes. They are software modules running on all nodes that maintain a MAC addresses database, to keep track of the VM addresses in the various LANs, process incoming input frames from physical interfaces and forward them based on the database.
For the intraLAN and interLAN communication the two most commonly used virtual switches are Linux Ethernet Bridge and Open vSwitch. Linux Bridge is a layer 2 virtual device, integrated in Linux OS. It mainly consists of four major components: i) a set of managed physical interfaces, ii) a control plane managing the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) (for network loops prevention), iii) a forwarding plane used to directs tra c to the appropriate interfaces based on mac address. Open vSwitch (OVS) has been around since 2009 but hasn't been a contender to Linux Bridge before 2014. OVS provides the same functionality, plus other Layer3 functions. Licensed under the open Source Apache 2.0, it implements a virtual multilayer network switch, designed to enable e ective network automation through programmatic extensions, while supporting standard management interfaces and protocols such as NetFlow, sFlow, SPAN, RSPAN, LACP and VLAN tagging. OVS is used in multiple products and testing environments.
Summing up the di erences between the virtual switches, OVS is targeted at large multi-server virtualization environments, so it is focused on logical abstraction and management. The Linux bridge is fast and reliable, but lacks many control features. IaaS like OpenStack and OpenNebula have started using OVS as default con guration in their networking framework. We also recommend the choice of OVS and assume this as a con guration choice in the following.
Multiple virtual switches (that in OVS are referred as bridges) can be deployed to separate groups of VLANs logically, e. g., internal lans versus others providing external services. Each VLAN is con gured using the IaaS to sit on a single, speci c bridge, as VMs receive their network address through the corresponding bridges (that, instead, have no address).
Physical Infrastructure Configuration.
Typically, the required physical infrastructure for the deployment of a Virtual Environment infrastructure consists of a number of physical servers (or nodes), each one with its own speci cations, and a number of physical switches, used to connect them ( Figure 1 ). The servers run the IaaS software: in the particular case of OpenNebula, a "master" node must be con gured to host the OpenNebula daemon, oned, and the Sunstone Frontend, that communicates with oned, via XML-RPC APIs. Other nodes just need to have the Hypervisor installed (package opennebula-kvm on Debian based systems).
If OpenNebula's Image Datastore is managed via GlusterFS, the servers must be connected through a switch (we will call this the "backbone" network): when new templates containing VM datastores are added to the master node, the GlusterFS daemon will start le transfers to keep replicas updated. To speed the sync between the replicas the bandwidth must be maximized. This translates to using high-end network interfaces on both the servers and the switch (i.e., use at least 10Gb ports). If this is not possible, a bandwidth improvement can be made via interface bonding.
Linux bonding driver provides a method for aggregating multiple network interfaces into a single logical "bonded" interface. In fact, the bonding allows combines several network interfaces into a single link, providing either high-availability, load-balancing, maximum throughput, or a combination of these. There are several bonding modes. One of them is mode 0 (balance-rr). In this mode, packets are transmitted in sequential order on the bond interfaces.
Furthermore, to enable VM communication via OVS bridges, the servers must be connected to a switch using one physical port per bridge. It is a good practice to use a separate switch for the backbone network and for OVS bridges, in order to physically separate business tra c pertaining to the emulated environment, and communication between the replicas.
All the logical pieces comprising the Emulation environment are resumed in Figure 1 .
Virtual Network Design
As previously stated, one of the objectives of an emulation environment is obtaining a separate, virtual and arbitrarily modi able copy of an existing network for conducting analysis and tests. In order to do that, fundamental inputs are the Network and Vulnerability Inventories and communication rules. Such inputs are commonly available in large enterprise networks as they are outputs of a continuous monitoring process and can be used to trigger cyber attacks detection and response processes. It is important to note that the e ectiveness of the monitoring, detection and response activities depends on the accuracy of the collected inventories.
Inventory collection tools, such as GFI LANGUARD Network Scanner, typically require an intrusive approach, where monitoring agents are preinstalled on each host system. Furthermore, such as for the case of LANGUARD, they usually require expensive licenses. For these reasons in the following we will direct our choices towards software tools that are free and allow to perform this phase in a non intrusive way.
Instead, when this information is not available, such inputs can, in principle, be collected manually by interviewing a network administrator that lists all the requirements and details of the desired virtual network or by collecting them starting from a real physical network.
2.2.1
Network topology identification. This task allows to obtain a logic schema of the network infrastructure of the reference network in terms of ISO/OSI layers 2 and 3, i.e., of how many subnetworks it is composed, how they are separated using network devices (e.g., router, hubs, switches), as well as the presence of rewalls and their relative con guration rules. Common approaches for network discovery rely on distributed traceroute monitors [2] : however, the accuracy of this approach strongly depends on the observability of the network.
Overall, this phase is the hardest to automate, as in order to be accurate it relies heavily on pre-existing knowledge about the reference network, such as the one coming from Network Administrators and Network schemes.
In the following, we make the assumption that the information about the number and composition of network LANS, as well as the network devices, is known a priori or can be determined by querying the network administrator.
Host and OS Detection.
Once that the network topology is known, an important step in the reference network mapping concerns identifying the computer hosts deployed in the network, to be able to replicate their presence in the virtual testbed. To this end, the primary information required is discovering active hosts on the network and their OS.
OS detection is the process of determining the OS of a remote computer [9] . When this is accomplished in a non intrusive way (i. e., , without deploying agents), it is achieved by observing the external behavior of the remote host, mostly in terms of network tra c, in a way to derive what is called an OS ngerprint 2 , adopting either an active or an passive approach.
Active OS ngerprinting requires sending specially crafted packet probes to the system in question, aiming at eliciting a distinguishable responses from di erent OS'es, derived from the implementation dissimilarities of their communication protocolsSystem responses from this active probing are then used to generate the ngerprint and fed into a classi cation model. Passive OS ngerprinting involves sni ng network tra c inside a network segment and matching known patterns to a table of pre-established OS identities. In general, active scanning allows for higher accuracy [13] , and passive is chosen only when a given degree of stealth or anonymity of capture is of concern(e.g., when aiming at performing malicious activities).
Tools. The most popular active network scanner is Nmap [7] , an open source tool designed for network exploration and security auditing. Nmap uses raw IP packets in novel ways to determine what hosts are available on the network, what services (application name and version) those hosts are o ering, what OS version they are running, what type of packet lters/ rewalls are in use, and dozens of other characteristics. Its output is composed of a list of scanned targets together with supplemental information on each, depending on the options used. Another tool o ering OS detection capability is OpenVAS, most known for its value as a vulnerability assessment tool (see Section 2.2.3). Let us note that each of these tools has its own characteristics and main target applications. As a consequence, the produced output will satisfy di erent level of quality depending on the considered attributes. To improve the overall quality (in terms of accuracy of the scan operation) it is mandatory to integrate several scanners combining their output. See [16] for an approach to combine results coming from Nmap and OpenVAS.
Active service discovery and vulnerability surface identification.
Determining what services are running on the network hosts is of primary importance to allow for an adequate mapping of the reference network. In particular, for cyber security purposes, what is of interest is understanding the hosts' exposed vulnerability surface, i.e. identifying which running services have an associated open port, and are thus, potentially directly exploitable.
A typical example is identifying DNS and HTTP servers are running and their respective versions. An accurate version number is key in determining which exploits a host is vulnerable to.
Vulnerability scanning tools usually produce a detailed report with the severity level of every vulnerability detected.
Tools.
OpenVAS is the open-source spin-o of the popular security scanner Nessus, and provides a modular architecture composed of a scanning agent and a manager with a powerful interface. The security scanner, is accompanied with a daily updated feed of Network Vulnerability Tests (NVT). Being one of the most powerful free security scanners, supports thousands of vulnerabilities and o ers false positive management of scanning results. However, being a free tool it su ers from limitations with respect to its paid counterparts, such as Nessus, Nexpose or LANGUARD, such as limited DB, and cumbersome con guration. Nmap is also capable of discovering open ports and associate services.
Testbed Configuration.
In this section we summarize the metadata needed in order to deploy our testbed, derived from the phase of Virtual Network Design. It is composed of Hosts conguration and Network con guration, consolidated in the Testbed Con guration (Figure 2 ).
Hosts Con guration Each host identi ed from the reference network is associated to an OS template in the Images Datastore, a list of installed services CPE (with optional version) and a list of network interfaces. Optionally, a host-speci c synthetic behavior can be embedded by deploying appropriate software code (see for example Section 4.1).
Network Con guration All network LANS will have a corresponding VLAN con guration, assigned to OVS Bridges also based on the data collection requirements (see Section 2.3). All layer 3 network devices will have a corresponding Virtual Router conguration, with their corresponding interfaces (see Section 2.1.3), physical Firewalls will correspond to Virtual Firewalls.
This information may be stored in a database or other means, if automation of the deployment is of concern. Most IaaS platforms o er their APIs to allow for automation of deployment to various extents. OpenNebula o ers a centralized XML-RPC interface that can be used to entirely manage the emulated testbed in an automatic way, such as creating VLANs, instantiating VMs, etc. In Section 3 can be found an example on how to fully automate the deployment of a test environment using OpenNebula API.
Data Collection
To wrap up all information concerning the communication layer from Section 2.1.3, a testbed contains a number of virtual machines whose network interfaces belong to a number of VLANs sitting on a number of OVS bridges. Layer3 routing between VLANs is handled by Virtual routers.
In this section, we elaborate on di erent techniques and solutions for achieving network tra c data capture in an emulated testbed deployed in an emulation environment.
The problem of capturing and decoding tra c in high-speed network, be it physical or virtual has been deeply studied (see for example [1, 4] ). In the context of a testbed for cyber security experimentation, the choice of a capturing solution depends on several criteria: reaction behavior, impact on network performance (delay, throughput), tra c rate and architectural considerations.
Typically, inline capture mode is preferred when the probe needs to react to intrusions (IPS) as it can alter or delete packets [5] . In particular, network taps can be implied, i. e., systems that are installed in network segments to monitor network devices such as routers, rewalls, servers and hosts by means of network, application, or security analyzers, achieving high-speed full duplex capture with no data loss. Inline capture mode might alter network performances due to packet processing delays, yet the analysis capacity of Next-Generation Intrusion Systems (NGIPS) in inline transparent mode has now reached speeds higher than the physical link, allowing for extremely low latencies [8] . However, inline taps are only suited to monitor a point-to-point link, thus not being a viable choice when the full data capture is of concern. Moreover, an inline probe failure can induce network failures.
On the other hand, passive mode is stealthier and does not alter the performances or the availability of the monitored network. A cheap option is capturing on the hardware switches, yet VM-to-VM tra c that does not pass over a physical wire (e.g., if they are on the same VLAN on the same server) would not be captured.
Depending on the capturing requirements, thanks to its high exibility and capabilities OVS can come to rescue.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, OVS bridges can help distributing the VLANs in logic compartments; this choice can also be made with data collection purposes in mind: indeed deploying the VLANs on di erent bridges allows the sni ng in speci c parts of the environment. However, even if the physical interface associated to each OVS bridge could be monitored, the issues related on same-node tra c is still present.
When internal tra c of the VLANs is of concern (as, for example, if full capture is desired), OVS supports port mirroring capabilities (with the SPAN and RSPAN protocol) [10] . For each network to be monitored, SPAN allows to mirror the tra c from all network interfaces toward a speci c output port (the SPAN port). To achieve full capture the best option is to have a SPAN port for each bridge, for each physical node. Span output ports can be for example a network interface of a "Sni er" VM, where the tra c is then collected to be later analyzed.
However, this solution can potentially su er from bandwidth limitation and data loss, as the full tra c is replicated and sent to the sni er.
A CASE STUDY: DIAG DEPARTMENT
As a candidate for a case study, we chose the network of the Department of Computer, Control, and Management Engineering Antonio Ruberti (DIAG). In particular, we followed the methodology described in Section 2 and set up an emulation environment based on
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OpenNebula, using OVS for the connection layer, and GlusterFS for maintaining a replicated Images Datastore, and deployed an emulated testbed.
The network topology of the department consists of seven subnets, that we will call LAN1, LAN2, LAN3, LAN4, CED, DMZ_INT and DMZ_EXT. The rst three contain personal workstations (with a few exceptions of servers) of research sta belonging to various research areas, like Computer Science, Automation and Control and Management Engineering and the fourth pertains to administrative sta . Furthermore, CED contains servers and compute nodes used by researchers to perform their work, while DMZ_INT hosts internal services, such as SMB or SFTP and nally DMZ_EXT hosts servers that expose services towards Internet (such as a WWW server and an SVN repository).
The following sections discuss each implementation step of the methodology in the context of this case study.
OS Detection and Vulnerability Discovery
We performed OS detection following a hybrid approach after executing Nmap and OpenVAS scans of each LAN. Further details on the approach can be found in [16] . Figure 3 shows the distribution of the di erent OS Families for each LAN, for a total of 215 hosts. Since we are interested in mapping each host to a VM Template, we need accuracy at the OS Generation level. Excluding all entries belonging to the Other Family (mostly network devices, rewalls, access points, etc.), we could unambiguously determine the OS Generation for about 60% of the host virtual machines, while relying solely on Nmap we could map only about 25% (mostly corresponding to Windows machines, for the reasons expressed in Section 2.2.2, while with OpenVAS alone we reached 45% overall. Unfortunately, due to problems with the KVM Hypervisor, we couldn't manage to emulate correctly the OSX Machines, and resorted to only keeping Windows and Linux VMs (the speci c OS Generations will be detailed in the following). OpenVAS and Nmap were also implied in the discovery of running services as well the known vulnerabilities for each host. Figure 4 reports the top occurring services found in the various LANs. Table 1 reports hardware con guration of our Virtual Environment infrastructure. The two servers, connected via the L2 switch Cisco Catalyst 2960 form the backbone network for GlusterFS tra c, while the second L3 Cisco Catalyst WS-C3850 switch is used for the emulation environment (OVS bridges)As detailed in the following, we will make use of 3 OVS bridges for networking. Each bridge uses a physical network interface on each server. The basic templates for the VMs and the ISO Images for the various operating systems are saved in the Image Datastore. Since we couldn't count on high performance Ethernet interfaces on the nodes, we adopted the Linux bonding strategy to maximize the bandwidth on the backbone network. In particular, we used Linux kernel bonds with bondmode 0, and 6 1GBps interfaces per node, achieving in this way a maximum bandwidth equal to 6 Gbps.
Physical infrastructure
Testbed Architecture
Due to lack of resources, and also considering other VMs necessary for networking, rewalling and generation of benign and malicious background tra c by external hosts, we could only a ord to instantiate about half of the identi ed host machines. We deployed all the VLANs necessary for replicating the reference network, using three OVS virtual bridges, namely br1, br2 and br3. The rst bridge will be devoted to internal, business LANs, the second to service-related VLANs, and network devices (routers and a rewall), while the third bridge provides Internet connection to the whole testbed hosting the interfaces of all such machines that need direct internet connection.
For VLAN Routing at Layer3, we made use of three Virtual Routers, namely VR0, VR1 and VR2. Furthermore, as per the reference network, we use a Virtual Firewall, FW. Virtual Routers run ZeroShell v3.8.2, a lightweight Linux Distribution suited for router emulation. For the rewall, we used PfSense 2.4.3.
More speci cally, the architecture is divided in the following parts: Internal Area: This area is composed by LAN1, LAN2, LAN3 and LAN4. The virtual networks are available to the virtual machines through the corresponding bridge br1. DMZ Area: CED and DMZ_INT provide internal services to authorized hosts in the Internal Area through VR1. DMZ_EXT contains servers exposing services to the Internet. Note that access to services in the DMZ area is allowed by well de ned rewall rules speci ed on FW. External Hosts: This VLAN, as well as Attackers, is used to simulate a portion of the Internet, made by hosts that will connect to services from the DMZ_EXT VLAN. Attackers: The Attackers network, hosts malicious external attackers that want to exploit or attack hosted services (Section 4.2). DMZ Area, Attackers and External Hosts VLANs are deployed on bridge br2. Table 2 summarizes the list of VLANs, networks addresses and number of hosts, with installed operating systems and related public and private IPs and services installed in the service LANs. Note that both External Hosts, Attackers and servers in the DMZ_EXT have ranges in the public IPv4 space: indeed we replicated a small portion of the internet inside our testbed.
In order for the communication from such networks to correctly reach the DMZ_EXT (instead of owing towards the Externet VLAN), a static route was con gured on VR2 to direct tra c with destination inside DMZ_EXT through VR2's interface on FWVR2.
Thus, tra c from such external hosts directed to DMZ_EXT will be routed by VR2, using the static route, and all the corresponding responses will return back to the originating hosts, since VR2 knows both External Hosts and Attackers through direct interfaces.
Testbed deployment The deployment of all VLANS, VMs, Virtual Routers and Firewall components was completely automated using a Python based module via the Python bindings of the XML-RPC APIs exposed by OpenNebula. In order to provide each machine with the appropriate services (with version) determined in the vulnerability surface identi cation phase, we created startup scripts according to each operating system family, that we feed with the services to be installed, so that they are fetched and installed automatically at rst machine boot.
A particular e ort must be devoted for the installation of the services, starting from the CPEs. Currently, there is no available data Figure 5 : Testbed network architecture: The VLANs arrangement in L2 OVS bridges is highlighted using blue boxes. Installed services on service LANs are also shown. Reported package versions were automatically installed in the testbed, original ones from the reference network are in parentheses.
source that allows to match application CPEs to actual packages. For this reason the mapping must resort to either a manual association, or a tentative automatic association based on similarity.
In particular, we resorted to manually mapping application CPE to software packages, that then were installed automatically using the closest version available in the repositories.
Benign Tra c Agents
To form the main part of our dataset, out aim was having realistic background tra c that comprises a number of widely used protocols, namely HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, SMB and SFTP, to act as background noise with respect to a number of tra c ows corresponding to speci c instantiated attack patterns.
To this end, we used a number of software agents written in Python to provide close-to-realistic user behavior for the VLANS from LAN1, through LAN4.
The agents' software consists in a number of tra c simulation jobs executed by worker threads managed by a scheduler, which feeds the threads following a speci c tra c pro le shown in Table 3 ), and assigned to each machine. In particular, on average, each job will be executed during the interval (Start, End) de ned in the pro le, a number of times depending on the Frequency pro le. The scheduler will randomize the time between the execution of each job to prevent the tra c from looking too synthetic. Furthermore, all jobs have an initial setup phase that always entails a degree of randomness in all con gurable parameters, as well as multipliers for randomly delaying each request.
In the following, we summarize the behavior of the simulation jobs for the di erent protocols supported by our agents.
HTTP/HTTPS generator: An HTTP job, "browses" the internet starting at pre-de ned root urls and simulates clicks by randomly following links on pages until a pre-de ned click depth of 7 is met. Wait time between HTTP requests is chosen at random uniformly between 5 and 10 seconds. The number of total http requests is given by a random integer generated uniformly between 1 and of 20. The value of the parameters has been chosen following previous research [18, 19] , that found that only about 5% of sessions are longer than 20 requests and the average session length is about 7. Note that to generate request that are compatible with the associated OS, each agent will perform requests with a speci c User-Agent that is automatically identi ed by the software based on the machine OS.
SSH generator: An SSH job connects to a host with the provided credentials using SSH and start sending commands selected at random from a list of supplied commands, keeping the connection open until a given period of time generated at random. The commands list is generated at startup time from a list of common commands such as 'ls', 'cd', 'cat /var/log/messages', etc.
SMB generator: A SMB job connects to a SMB share with the provided credentials and uploads and downloads a number of les or directories. The les are randomly generated and their size are controlled by an optional size multiplier of the default size of 8192 bytes.
SFTP generator: An SFTP generator connects to a host with the provided credentials using the SSH subsystem SFTP. It then starts uploading and downloading les provided with the same parameters of the SMB generator. Hosts  Servers  WEB  9:00 18:30  15  All  *  SMB1  9:00 18:00  60 All but h2  lsrv  SMB2 14:00 18:00  180 All but h2  lsrv  SSH3  9:00 18:00  60  h1  ced2  SSH4 9:00 18:00 240 h2 lsrv, ced1-3, int1-3 SSH5 9:00 18:00 60 h3 ced3 SSH6 9:00 18:00 60 h4 int1 SSH7 9:00 18:00 60 h5 int2 SFTP 9:00 18:00 240 All but h2 int3 Table 3 : Tra c generator pro les for the various supported protocols. All, refers generically to all hosts in the four business VLAN1-4. The reported custom hosts correspond to: h1 The agents' code has been deployed at machine instantiation time using init scripts, and the resulting processes are con gured as systemd (Ubuntu 14.04+, Debian) or upstart jobs (Ubuntu until 14.04), and using Task Scheduler on all Windows OS versions, con gured to run as automatic startup jobs and to be automatically restarted in case of failures.
Type Start End Freq
Attack pro les and scenarios
To give a practical demonstration of the power and exibility of our emulated environment, we performed various cyber attacks in the testbed, covering a diverse set of attack scenarios. In particular, starting from common attack taxonomies, 4 attack pro les were selected, and executed by using related tools and codes.
Brute Force: A brute force attack can target di erent types of services. The main goal of this attack is obtaining private information, i. e., a password, or private key, by testing many input combinations through a trial and error process, until the private information is nally gathered. This attack is one of the easiest to perform and detect, given the huge amount of tra c generated by the probing process. In particular, we performed a Dictionarybased brute-force attack to an OpenSSH daemon running on a Linux Machine.
Heartbleed: Heartbleed is a vulnerability of the OpenSSL implementation of the SSL protocol. The name comes from a speci c function introduced in version 1.0.1, called HeartBeat: this extension allows the clients to test and keep a connection alive without the need of re-negotiating it from scratch. Thus, su ering from a bu er-over-read vulnerability, it allows the clients to read more data than expected, possibly leaking sensitive information. To perform this attack, an SSL connection must be instantiated with a vulnerable server, sending a malformed Heartbeat request.
Web Application Attack: Attacks on web applications may target di erent services. The OWASP Top 10 3 shows the most common pattern for this speci c attack surface, where the targets span from simple websites to complex CMS. As a practical case, we targeted the Drupal CMS version 7.31, vulnerable to a Remote 3 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10-2017_Top_10 Command Execution (RCE) exploit called drupalgeddon2 (CVE 2018-7600). With this attack, it is possible to obtain control of the attacked server by exploiting a sanitization vulnerability in the AJAX requests allowing the attacker to force the vulnerable server to execute arbitrary malicious code.
LAN Attack (+ Ransomware Deployment): This attack pattern was introduced to represent an insider threat, i. e., a malicious user who has access to the organization's internal network. We conducted a lateral spreading attack by exploiting an SMB vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) a ecting various Microsoft Windows versions, as made by the Eternalblue exploit used in 2017 for spreading the Dou-blePulsar backdoor. In this case, the attack started from an intruder Kali Linux, connected to the LAN1. The attack begins with a series of Nmap scans (alive, services) towards LAN4, where a victim is found having a vulnerable Windows 7 system. The attacker installs a reverse TCP shell via Eternalblue and using a local HTTP server installed on the attacker machine downloads and runs the famous WannaCry software on the victim machine.
All the speci c attack steps as well as the corresponding timeline will be publicly released along with the full capture dataset.
Data Collection
Our data collection objective was gathering full tra c capture for all VLANs pertaining to the department network infrastructure, namely LAN1 through LAN4, FWVR0, FWVR1, as well as the service LANs CED, DMZ_INT and DMZ_EXT.
Following the directions discussed in Section 2.3, to perform the full tra c capture, we deployed a sni er VM for each pair (n, b) (where n is a node and b is an OVS bridge) having one network interface on each VLAN belonging to bridge b. Each of such port has been con gured to be the output port of a SPAN mirror, that receives tra c from all interfaces of VLAN , belonging to machines deployed on node n. We thus captured tra c from all sniffers network interfaces using the Linux network tra c capturing tool tcpdump.
The data capturing period started at 14:30 on 25 July 2018 and continuously ran for an exact duration of 4 days, ending at 14:30 on 29 July 2018. As described in the previous section, it contains both benign tra c generated with our agents as well as malicious tra c ows. Concerning the latter, we deployed some instances of the attack pro les reported in Section 4.2 and extracted the corresponding network tra c from the captures to obtain a list of attack-tra c subcaptures. Statistics for each attack are shown in Table 4 , i. e., involved hosts, attack timespans (start, end and duration), total number of packets, average packets per second and average packet size in bytes. The PortScan row refers to the Nmap scanning phase of the LAN Attack scenario. Furthermore, we processed all attack-tra c captures with a ow-based feature extractor [6, 14] , in a way to extract 80 features for all included ows, where each ow corresponds to a (SrcIP, SrcPort, DstIP, DstPort,Protocol) tuple. The extracted features are useful for training Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS, IPS) classi ers and other machine-learning tasks for cyber security analyses [14] . Table 4 : Time and statistics for the attack instances deployed in the testbed. Times are in CEST timezone
To summarize, the dataset 4 contains the following information: Full daily captures: One PCAP le per day with the full capture for each VLAN. Attacks: A separated PCAP les for each attack, as per Table 4 , as well as a description of the necessary steps to replicate it. Benign A separate PCAP le with all tra c from LAN1-LAN4 for 26/07, containing only benign (agent-related) ows, as per Table 3 ).
Features for each PCAP le, a CSV le containing, for each extracted ow, the values for 80 tra c related features.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes a methodology for the design, development and deployment of cloud-based emulation environments. We show its e ectiveness by applying our methodology to build an emulation environment for the study case of our Department network, as well as its exibility to simulate actual cyber attacks and benign tra c, that we collected in a publicly released dataset containing complete network traces, enriched with labeled features. The main use case of the work is the deployment of cyber ranges, allowing for controlled experiments in the cyber security domain. However, its applications are endless: training IDS/IPS detection algorithms, testing multi-tiered applications and more generally conducting any analysis on software architectures that is not related to performance, which would instead require a copy of the underlying physical network. A limitation is the lack of an evaluation of the accuracy of the information acquired from the reference network, due to unavailability of ground truth, which would require an intrusive approach. As a future step in this direction, we plan to work on the de nition of a strategy to measure the a nity of the nal emulated environment and the original reference network. The next step in our investigation will be toward the de nition of novel approaches to develop user behavior pro lers to improve the quality of benign data generators in terms of closeness to real human behavior. Additionally, we plan to investigate approaches to fully automate the installation of services, which is currently an open issue.
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